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India has the second largest road system in the world with a road length of 3.3 million
kms. There is, however, a high disparity in construction quality and road conditions
nationwide. As of 1998-9, the Indian transport sector handled 870 billion tonne kms
(btkms) of freight and 2,450 billion passenger kms (bpkms) of passenger traffic. Of this,
the road sector carried 566 btkms (65 per cent) of freight and 2,132 bpkms (87 per
cent) of passenger traffic.  The btkms and bpkms by road grew at the rate of 12 per
cent and 8.4 per cent respectively during the nineties [Ministry of Road Transport and
Highways, and World Bank, 2002]. In the past 50 years, while the aggregate length of
the roads has increased eightfold, the traffic has increased to almost twentyfold,
resulting in congestion [World Bank, 2000].
To reduce the congestion and improve road quality, the central and state governments
have focused on road development projects in the recent years (Box 1). Public private
partnerships have also been leveraged through the Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT)
framework.
Importance of Tolling to the BOT Projects
In the BOT projects, revenue through tolling is used as an important mechanism to
attract private financing. (Annuities payments to the BOT operator is catching up as an
alternate mechanism). Revenues are generated from toll collection for operating and
maintaining the road as well as recovering the overall project costs. Internationally,
about 95 per cent of the revenues of toll road come from the tolls themselves [World
Bank, 1999]. Thus tolling is a very critical area in the concession agreement and needs
a fair amount of analysis to verify the financial prospects.
However, in spite of efforts by the government, the toll collection system in India has
not been very successful. One such example is the Coimbatore Bypass project, where
there are concerns (even as of August 2002) of toll compliance and the financial
viability of the project is in question. In this paper, we highlight the various issues
raised by this project, which is a national highway toll road project.
                                                
1 This paper is partly based on a note by Mr M Abul Hassan, (Former) Secretary
Highways, Government of Tamil Nadu (July, 2000), and A Note on Toll Collection in
Coimbatore Athupalam Bridge, Government of Tamil Nadu (September, 2000).2
The Coimbatore Bypass Experience
The Coimbatore Bypass project questions the responsibility of the government in public
private partnership projects. L&T Transportation Infrastructure Ltd (LTTIL), the BOT
operator, is facing financial problems, experiencing a difficult time collecting tolls from
the Athupalam Bridge segment of the Coimbatore Bypass project. This experience
raises the issue that if the government is reluctant to provide the required support and
action, the future of public private toll based road development projects is not very
bright.
Background
The story began in September 1995, when the Ministry of Surface Transport (MoST),
GOI, floated a global tender to select a private sector participant for development of the
Coimbatore Bypass.
Coimbatore, the second largest city in Tamil Nadu, also known as the ‘Manchester’ of
the state, was a prosperous industrial city. It was well connected by both the national
highway and state highway networks. The national highway No 47 (NH 47) passed
through the city, connecting Salem with Kanyakumari. Congestion within the city
caused heavy traffic delays and hence a need was felt to construct a bypass to the city.
The alignment, traversing a length of 27.67 km, was finalized in 1974. Land for a width
of 40 to 45 m was acquired for this purpose at the same time. However, construction
was delayed due to inadequate funding arrangements.
LTTIL was the only firm which responded to the tender and submitted a conditional bid
to construct and operate the Coimbatore Bypass. The conditions in the bid included the
addition of, (i) a bridge (the Athupalam Bridge) over Noyyal river on NH 47 in the city
(close to the city limits), and (ii) a rail over bridge (ROB) on NH 209 (Coimbatore-
Dindigul Road), to the project scope of the Coimbatore Bypass project. These segments
would also be tolled in order to improve financial viability of project.
The bid was discussed in detail with the state government. Based on the argument that
the 27.67 km bypass road, linking the Southern (Coimbatore-Kanyakumari) segment of
NH 47 with the Northern (Coimbatore-Salem) segment of the same NH, was not viable
on its own, the state government agreed to enlarge the scope of the project. It included
the construction of an additional bridge (to make the two lane into a four lane right of
way) near the old Athupalam Bridge, across Noyyal river. The ROB on NH 209 was not
considered. Subsequently, a tripartite concession agreement was signed between
MoST, Tamil Nadu State Government and LTTIL on 13 October 1997.3
Project Scope
The scope of the project thus included two distinct segments, (i) construction of the
bypass, and (ii) construction of a two lane Athupalam Bridge across Noyyal river on NH
47. (A map indicating the location of the Coimbatore Bypass and its adjoining road
network is shown in exhibit 1). This project was the first to be executed on a BOT basis
in the state.
(i)  Coimbatore Bypass: Construction of bypass for a length of 27.67 km, having a
two lane 7.5 m carraigeway with paved shoulders configuration. The alignment
of the bypass intersected two major roads which had since been notified as
national highways, namely, the Coimbatore Pollachi Road (NH 209) and
Coimbatore Karur Road (NH 54A). The bypass component included construction
of two ROBs, one major bridge (across river Noyyal, called Noyyal Bridge), 10
minor bridges and other cross drainage structures.
(ii) Athupalam Bridge: Construction of two additional lanes to the existing bridge
over river Noyyal on NH 47 at km 161/8 was proposed as part of the bypass
project to ease congestion on the existing bridge.
The cost of the project was estimated at Rs 90 crores (87 crores for the Coimbatore
Bypass and 3 crores for the Athupalam Bridge), the recovery of which was proposed
through collection of tolls on both the bypass and the bridge.
As per the agreement, LTTIL was given a concession to levy toll for a period of 20 years
on the Athupalam Bridge and 30 years on the Coimbatore Bypass. The agreement
clearly specified that while the traffic risk was with LTTIL, the risk due to non-payment
of tolls would be with the state government. The toll rates as agreed in the concession
agreement are presented in exhibit 2.
Opening of the Athupalam Bridge Segment
The work on the project commenced in December 1997. The Athupalam Bridge was
completed first and opened to traffic in 12 December 1998.
From the very first day of commissioning and opening the traffic at the Athupalam
Bridge, the Bus Owner’s Association (BOA) and the public had been protesting against
the toll collection. The bridge users were agitated about the collection of toll fee for
each trip and refused to pay, resulting in frequent blockades and crowding near the toll
plaza. The Collector convened a series of meetings with various Associations between
13 and 19 December 1998 on this issue. The users felt that due to construction of this
new bridge, unnecessary financial burden was put on them. Various organizations had
proposed to go on strike, opposing the collection of the toll fee on the bridge. He4
requested the state government for complete w a i v e r  o n  t o l l  f ee at the Athupalam
Bridge.
LTTIL made several representations to the state government in an attempt to resolve
the issue. The State Transport Corporations (STCs), together with private buses, local
trucks and taxi operators who made multiple trips on the bridge, expressed their
unwillingness to pay the toll for every trip.
The Minister for Highways and Ports convened a meeting with the Minister of Forest
and Environment, the Collector, LTTIL and various Association representatives on 4
January 1999.  In the meeting, he proposed the following suggestions:
(i)  Introduction of concessional toll rate of Rs 50 per day for unlimited trips for
government and private buses
(ii)  Reduction in monthly tariff rate from Rs 325 to Rs 300 for all non commercial
vehicles, and
(iii)  Full exemption for government vehicles, mortuary vans and convoys.
(iv)  A recommendation to be made to the GOI, requesting compensation for the losses
incurred due to the above concession.
LTTIL accepted suggestion (i) above, but restricted it to the STCs with the condition
that the GOI should compensate the financial loss. LTTIL insisted on retaining the toll
per trip as agreed in the concessional agreement for the private buses, local trucks and
taxi operators.
The Tamil Nadu and Kerala STCs started paying concessional tolls, whereas the BOA
refused to pay the toll amount. The BOA filed a writ petition on 31 March 1999 in the
Chennai High Court challenging the collection of toll at Athupalam Bridge. The High
Court dismissed the petition on 21 September 1999 and passed an interim order that
the BOA must pay the tolls as per the concession. (LTTIL was supposed to keep an
account of vehicles of BOA which paid the toll fee and refund the amount paid, if the
judgement was pronounced against it).
The Secretary held a meeting on 22 July 1999 with the Collector and various
Associations of road users. In spite of an appeal by the Secretary and the Collector, the
Associations stuck to their demand. A situation arose where it was found that forceful
collection of toll might lead to serious law and order problem. The daily toll collection of
the bridge came down from Rs 110,000 per day during December 1998 to Rs 40,000
per day in September 1999.
The Coimbatore National Highways Wing conducted a one week traffic survey of the
Athupalam Bridge from 19 to 25 November 1999. The survey gave the profile of the
usage of the bridge by examining the number of trips made per day by different types
of vehicles (exhibit 3). As can be seen, buses were the largest high frequency users of5
the bridge. About one per cent of car/jeeps/vans (CJVs), about 20 per cent of buses
and less than one per cent of trucks made four or more trips per day
LTTIL expressed its inability to enforce toll collection and requested the state
government to provide police support. In response to the request, the state police force
was deployed on cost basis from 30 December 1999. But even this did not bring any
major improvement in the compliance.
Opening of the Bypass Segment
The bypass was opened to traffic in January 2000. The actual total cost on completion
of the project was Rs 110 crores, of which Rs 42 crores was funded by LTTIL as equity
and Rs 68 crores by institutional financiers as debt. The cost was more than what was
planned for due to (i) the introduction of an additional road over bridge in the bypass
segment, (ii) additional works on either side of the Athupalam bridge, including the
construction of a control room, and (iii) interest during construction due to delays.
In the mean time, the matter of non compliance of toll at the Athupalam Bridge
continued. This was viewed seriously by the GOI. The Union Minister of Surface
Transport wrote to the Chief Minister, Tamil Nadu, to intervene in the matter. In a letter
dated 28 April 2000, the Chief Minister assured smooth collection of toll on the bridge.
The state government had been periodically addressing the Collector to personally
monitor and ensure smooth collection of the toll. After the posting of police personnel,
the situation had improved slightly, but not completely. The private buses and trucks
continued not to pay toll.
The BOA filed a review petition in the Chennai High Court immediately after the
dismissal of the previous writ petition. The Court dismissed the petition on 16 June
2000. BOA disregarded the Court’s order and refused to pay the tolls.
As of July 2000, LTTIL reported a loss of Rs 8.5 crores due to unrecovered toll (Exhibit
4). This was claimed as compensation from the state government. LTTIL had data
about toll collection on the number of trips made by different class of vehicles at
Athupalam Bridge from December 1998 to July 2000. On the basis of this information,
comparative projections were made on the revenue that could have been realized if (i)
the tolls were paid strictly according to the agreement, (ii) the amount was collected at
concessional toll rate of Rs 50 per day for unlimited trips for government and private
buses, and (iii) all the suggestions of the Minister of Highways and Ports were
implemented.
Accordingly, the traffic calculations pointed out that if the Minister’s suggestion was
accepted and implemented, the real collections could have been much more than what
was actually collected during the period. This was because the willingness to pay would
have been higher if the toll rates were capped for high frequency users. The analysis6
showed that LTTIL could have collected Rs 11.0 crores according to the Minister’s
suggestion. However, LTTIL could collect only Rs 2.9 crores.
The state government commented that the loss claimed by LTTIL was a result of the
company’s ‘inflexible’ attitude. The state government could not be held responsible for
it. It pointed out that if the suggestion of the Minister was accepted, the loss could have
been limited to Rs 33.4 lakhs. This amount could be easily compensated by cash or a
slight increase in the concession period.
Given the response of the state government, LTTIL notified the central government for
invoking the provisions of the concession agreement. Considering this, the Secretary,
MoST, wrote to the Secretary, Highways, Government of Tamil Nadu, on 31 August
2000, drawing attention towards the obligatory requirements of the state government,
being a signatory to the tripartite agreement. The Secretary asked the Collector to take
effective steps for enforcement of smooth collection of tolls at Athupalam Bridge.
The Situation in July 2002
The Athupalam Bridge users were still protesting against payment of tolls, though the
traffic density at the bridge was increasing. One form of protest by the buses/LCVs and
other frequent users was to leave their vehicles at the bridge, thereby creating
hindrances to other road users. This increased the queuing/waiting time to about 40-45
minutes. Some users just broke the signal barriers and speed away.
The average daily toll collection at the bridge was around Rs 70,000 to 75,000 per day
as against the projected revenue of Rs 1.8 lakhs to Rs 2.0 lakhs per day. The
compliance of the toll collection on the bypass road was reported to be satisfactory. The
number of vehicles using the bypass road daily was about 3,500. The collection at the
bypass road was about Rs 84,000 per day, which was 70 per cent of the estimated Rs
1.2 lakhs per day (based on LTTIL’s own studies prior to the project).
According to the original revenue projections, 60 per cent of the revenue was to come
from collection of toll at Athupalam Bridge and the balance 40 per cent from users of
the bypass road.
The company recorded a loss of Rs 5.9 crores for the year 2001-2, adding to a
cumulative loss of Rs 12.6 crores [LTTIL Annual Report, 2002]. About 230 buses made
a minimum of 2,180 trips a day. The company claimed it would sustain a loss of Rs
20,000 per day on government buses alone. The cost of deployment of the police was
also borne by LTTIL. It paid security charges of Rs 53 lakhs for the year 2001-2. The
financial institutions were putting pressure on LTTIL for creating additional securities.
The interest payment worked out to Rs 9 crores per year.7
With such a financial position, it was clear that unless the company was given powers
by the government to take stringent action against the non payers, it would be
impossible for the company to recover its investments on the project. The proposal to
extend the project concession period to make up for the loss in collection was not
perceived as beneficial to the company because of the discounted value of money.
LTTIL felt that if the situation did not improve, the company would be forced to request
the state government to take over the project by invoking the force majeure clause.
Issues Raised by the Coimbatore Bypass Experience
After four years of implementation of the project, LTTIL has recorded a cumulative loss
of Rs 12.6 crores. Was the traffic itself less than projections or has toll non compliance
been the major cause? The overall experience states that the usage of Athupalam
Bridge is heavy and the construction of the bridge has been a major convenience to the
users. (Prior to this BOT project, there was a single seven-metre wide carriageway over
the river, which made it difficult for even two commercial vehicles to cross at a time.
Often, there used to be waits due to congestion. After construction of the new bridge,
there is a separate way for either direction).
The reasons behind this ‘unpleasant’ experience include the following:
(a) Project structuring: Only one private party bid for the project. This was mainly due
to deficiency in project structuring, both scope wise and financially. LTTIL bid for the
project with the condition that the Athupalam Bridge segment should be bundled
with the bypass segment to make it financially viable.
(b) Public consultation: Neither any demand or willingness to pay surveys were carried
out nor any initiative was taken towards preparing the users for a high class facility
that saved on operational costs like time, fuel, wear and tear, etc. There was no
prior public consultation or discussion with opinion makers before deciding to levy
toll on the bridge.
(c) Biased revenue analysis: Revenue projections were expected in the ratio of 40:60
from the bypass and the bridge, whereas the investment towards the construction
was in the ratio of 87:3. The bridge users were supposed to cross subsidize the
bypass users.
(d) Delays due to queuing: The tolling on the bridge had its attendant queuing and
waiting time. The public looked upon this as a hindrance instead of improved levels
of service.8
(e) Local traffic: The Athupalam Bridge was located close to the city limits of
Coimbatore. The volume of local traffic was very high. There was an unwillingness
to pay toll, especially since they had not paid tolls for the bridge crossing prior to
the construction of the new two lane bridge.
(f) Multiple trips: The agreement provided for collection of tolls only on the basis of
single trips made across the bridge. It ignored the users that made multiple trips per
day. Such users found trip wise toll charges an expensive affair.
(g) Toll on existing bridge: The agreement provided for collection on the existing two
lane bridge. After the construction of the new two lane bridge, each bridge was
being used uni-directionally. Public objected to the toll being levied on the existing
bridge for which LTTIL had not made any additional investment.
(h) Enforcement: Local taxi operators, bus operators, and commercial fleet operators
had formed associations to protest against toll collection and were refusing to pay
toll. Despite public protest, toll collection continued, but with poor/low compliance.
LTTIL had appealed to the government to suitably amend the Motor Vehicles Act to
empower a private entrepreneur to enforce toll collection and regulate traffic flow
for users refusing to pay the toll charges.
Lessons
In the Coimbatore Bypass case, in spite of the government being responsible for the
payment risk, it is not fulfilling its role by taking action towards ensuring toll compliance
or compensating for the losses. If the response from the government remains so, future
public private road projects would be in jeopardy, as already feared for the forthcoming
BOT bridge projects in Kuzhithurai on NH-47, Vaniyambadi and Pachakupam on NH-46
in Tamil Nadu [Financial Express, 2000].
There is no clarity between the government and the developer on the resolution of
problems, if the project does get into unanticipated problems. This would be a major
deterrent for private players to invest in road development projects. Other fundamental
deterrents are perceived risk due to problems in estimating traffic demand and
willingness to pay.
Tolls based road projects are demand sensitive. This is more so in urban roads where
the willingness to pay is almost nil. Also, the extent of homework to identify various
user segments (for example, single trip versus multiple trip users) and develop an
appropriate tolling structure is significant. The consequence would be that the
construction and maintenance of city roads would be ignored under the toll based road
development concept.9
This aspect raises the basic issue of sustainability of tolling on the Indian highways.
Commercial truck operators (who form the largest segment of road users) have been
opposing the concept of tolls since they are already paying motor vehicles tax and a
cess on diesel and petrol. They have also expressed concerns that a significant share of
their revenues are consumed by tolls. [The Tribune Online Edition, 2002]
Considering the above, annuity based projects rather than toll based seem to have a
better future. Annuity based projects are those where the revenue streams are provided
to the BOT operator, either based on traffic volumes, or as a pre-determined amount.
While this idea directly addresses the unwillingness to pay tolls by the user, it moves
away from the economic principle of demand being influenced by the user fees.
The Coimbatore Bypass project also has a lesson for project structuring. in that we
cannot resort to ‘inappropriate’ bundling to make the projects financially viable.
The country’s largest road development project, the National Highways Development
Project (NHDP), is concentrating on arterial road building with appropriate incentives for
quick construction and maintenance. The primary financing is through a cess on fuel
(Box 1). The BOT framework has been used to a certain extent. For the BOT projects,
annuities rather than tolling seems to be preferred route, though the National Highways
Authority of India (NHAI) has reserved the right of tolling.10
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Toll Rates as per the Concession Agreement
Category of Vehicle Toll on Athupalam
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Auto rickshaws, two wheelers and slow moving vehicles are exempt from paying tolls.
Source: Government of Tamil Nadu13
Exhibit 3
Profile of Usage of Athupalam Bridge by Different Types of Vehicles up to July 2000
(Trips and Vehicles in ‘000s)


































1 81.1 3323.0 3323.0 85.8 84.4 1028.0 1028.0 88.2 65.6 1403.8 1403.8 64.9
2 16.1 657.6 328.8 11.8 13.1 159.7 79.9 9.9 10.4 222.0 111.0 10.2
3 1.9 78.3 26.1 1.6 1.8 21.8 7.3 1.3 4.7 99.5 33.2 4.8
4 and more 0.9 38.5 8.5 0.8 0.7 8.7 1.9 0.6 19.3 413.6 61.1 20.1
Total 100.0 4097.4 3686.4 100.0 100.0 1218.2 1117.1 100.0 100.0 2138.9 1609.1 100.0


































1 91.27 2418.9 2418.9 91.9 98.9 118.8 118.8 98.2 81.1 8292.5 8292.5 87.9
2 7.14 189.2 94.6 6.6 1.1 1.3 0.7 1.8 12.0 1229.8 615.0 8.8
3 0.84 22.3 7.4 0.9 - - - - 2.2 221.9 74.0 2.6
4 and more 0.75 19.9 4.0 0.6 - - - - 4.7 480.7 75.5 0.7
Total 100.0 2650.3 2524.9 100.0 100.0 120.2 119.5 100.0 100.0 10225.0 9057.0 100.0
Source: (i) Total no of trips and vehicles is from Toll Plaza data of December 1998 to July 2000. Similar data had been
obtained in the one week survey between 19 to 25 November 1999 by Coimbatore National Highway Wing
(ii) % of vehicles unpaid is from the one week survey14
Exhibit 4
Analysis of Toll Collections at Athupalam Bridge from December 1998 to July
2000
(Rs ‘000s)





























1 CJVs 20,486.87 18,432.16 20,422.71 9574.81
2 LCVs 18,272.99 16,757.04 18,240.50 4089.18
3 Buses 32,083.52 24,136.58 28,937.71 1482.01
4 Trucks 39,753.86 37,873.97 39,656.07 11589.10
5 MAVs 2,763.79 2,748.45 2,763.79 1836.04
Total 113,361.02 99,948.20 110,020.78 28,571.14
Loss (13,412.82) (3,340.24) (84,789.88)
1 No of trips multiplied by respective toll rates
2 No of vehicles per day multiplied by respective toll rates
3 For vehicles upto three trips per day: No of trips multiplied by respective toll rates.
For vehicles doing four or more trips per day: No of vehicles multiplied by Rs 15 for
CJVs and Rs 50 for the other vehicles
Source: A Note on Toll Collection in Coimbatore Athupalam Bridge, Government of
Tamil Nadu, September 200015
Box 1
Road Development Initiatives
Considering the heavy demand for quality roads, the central government has been
taking initiatives to attract the private sector for road development (Table 1). The
government has finalized model concession agreements for large (over Rs 100 crores)
and small (under Rs 100 crores) Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) projects. The
primary revenue generation for these BOT projects is through tolls. Due to difficulties
and costs of toll collections, the government has also initiated annuity based BOT
projects, wherein revenue streams would be provided to the BOT operator, either based
on traffic volumes, or as a pre-determined amount. As of December 2000, Ministry of
Surface Transport (MoST) and National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) had signed
concession agreements with private sector for development of about 20 road projects
involving an investment of Rs 1,000 crores under the BOT scheme [Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways, 2002]. Since private toll roads were relatively new in India, it
was not surprising that the initial projects were bypasses and bridges, with no road
stretches being taken up.
The state governments have also been trying to attract the private sector to participate
in road development to have access to entrepreneurial skills and private funds. For
example, the Government of Gujarat has budgeted an amount of Rs 19,951 crores for
road development from the total infrastructural development cost of Rs 116,993 crores
until 2010. Out of the road development funds, it has proposed 16 BOT road projects
comprising of 423 kms with an investment of Rs 1,414 crores [Government of Gujarat,
1999]. As another example, the Madhya Pradesh Government took the initiative of
attracting the private sector on BOT basis for state highway road projects that involved
upgradation and maintenance with toll based revenues. Since, the projects were
financially ‘unviable,’ they were awarded on a ‘least subsidy’ criterion. As of June 2002,
the government had awarded 13 projects of about 1,800 kms costing Rs 945 crores, for
which the subsidy amount was Rs 460 crores [Government of Madhya Pradesh, 2002].
Out of the 3.3 million kms of roads, the national highways are about 58,000 kms.
Though constituting only 1.75 per cent of the total road network, they carried over 45
per cent of the total traffic in 2000-1. As a consequence, most stretches of the national
highways are congested. In this context, the MoST, with the support of the Prime
Minister, has decided to take up capacity improvements on the national highways,
called the National Highways Development Project (NHDP). The NHAI is implementing
the NHDP.
The NHDP involves four laning (and six laning in certain stretches) of the (i) Golden
Quadrilateral, connecting the four metros of Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai with
spurs to the major ports, (ii) North-South and East-West Corridors connecting Srinagar
to Kanyakumari and Silchar to Porbandar respectively and (iii) a few other road16
stretches. The size of the NHDP is about 14,000 kms and the estimated cost of the
project is Rs 58,000 crores (as of July 2002). The Golden Quadrilateral has a length of
5,846 kms, and is expected to be completed by December 2003. The North-South and
East-West Corridors cover the length of 4,000 and 3,300 kms, and are expected to be
completed by December 2007. The confidence that the government has for the
completion of this project is largely due to the ‘ring fenced’ funds from the cess on
petrol and diesel. This fund in turn has enabled leveraging other funds. The financing
plan of the NHDP is presented in table 2.
Table 3 gives a profile of the BOT projects under the NHDP. These projects constitute
8.23 per cent of the total length and 12.12 per cent of the total project cost of the
NHDP. The rest of the project is to be executed in the traditional contract mode.
Table 1
Government Policy Initiatives for Attracting Private Investment in Roads
•  Private sector allowed to retain toll money
•  Government will carry out all preparatory work including land acquisition and utility
removal. Right of way (ROW) to be made available to concessionaires free from all
encumbrances.
•  NHAI/Government of India (GOI) to provide capital grant up to 40 per cent of
project cost to enhance viability on a case to case basis
•  100 per cent tax exemption for five years and 30 per cent relief for next five years,
which may be availed of in 20 years.
•  Concession period allowed up to 30 years
•  Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 based on UNICITRAL provisions.
•  The Housing and Real Estate development which is an integral part of the Highway
project will be treated as infrastructure and will be entitled for same tax benefits
•  NHAI permitted to participate in equity in BOT projects upto 30 per cent of total
equity.




























Toll Based Projects Non-NHAI Tolls 7 435 3,314
Annuity Projects Mostly
Non-NHAI
Annuity 8 476 2,354
NHAI Driven SPVs NHAI Tolls 7 241 1,364
Total 22 1,152 7,032
Total under NHDP 14,000 58,000
Per cent of BOT Projects to
Total under NHDP
8.23 12.12
Per cent of BOT/Toll Based
Projects to Total under NHDP
4.83 8.07
 Source: www.nhai.org